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                                                          ABSTRACT 
Corruption Norms and Corporate Tax Avoidance in a Weak Institutional Environment: 
Evidence from Alcohol Consumption in China 
 
by 
GUO Can Flora 
Master of Philosophy 
 
Both anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests a relation between cultural norms and 
illegitimate corporate behaviour. The mechanisms through which cultural norms exert 
effect on corporate behaviour include socialization, learning and networking, and 
employee selection. Being among the most significant elements of traditional Chinese 
culture, alcoholic drinking is the prime lubricant for social interactions and often serves to 
facilitate business dealings and exchange of favours. It is widely believed that drinking is 
a hotbed of power abuse and corruption. In order to improve our understanding of the 
determinants of corporate behaviour, this study is aimed at examining whether corruption 
norms inferred from the drinking culture are associated with tax noncompliance as 
measured by the firm’s effective tax rate (ETR). The sample involves 14,511 
observations and 2,169 unique firms in 2004-2013. By exploiting geographic variation in 
local culture of alcohol consumption, the preliminary results indicate that ETRs are 
significantly lower in firms headquartered in the regions with a higher level of alcohol 
consumption. The result is also robust when I use different measures of tax avoidance and 
regional sin culture. Further, I adopt an instrumental variable method where the possibly 
endogenous variable is instrumented. Specifically, I instrument for Alcohol_consumption 
with the regional average temperature. The logic is that temperature has effect on alcohol 
consumption rather than corporate tax reporting behavior. I continue to find a strong 
positive relation between alcohol consumption and tax avoidance. The effect is more 
significant for firms with higher managerial incentives to avoid tax and for firms located 
in weak institutional environment but weaker when external scrutiny from the government 
and the media is more stringent. 
  
As revealed by the results, absent market-supporting institutions, the enforcement of tax 
laws and regulations without a corresponding effort to combat alcohol-related sin culture 
is less likely to be effective. From the perspective of tax policy, the results suggest that 
policymakers ought to pay more attention to the possible role played by informal culture 
when examining corporate behavior. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Culture is regarded as the beliefs and values held by various ethnic, religious, and social 
groups for faithful inheritance from one generation to another (Guiso et.al, 2006). The 
explosion of work on economic institutions in late 1990s motivated scholars to go 
beyond the formal institutions into the informal cultural aspect such as social norms 
(Landes, 1998). Guiso et al. (2015) realize that in an incomplete contractual 
environment, value can definitely play a role in addressing the inefficiency caused by 
the incomplete contract. For example, when contracts are incomplete, plenty of deals 
are premised on mutual trust and may be concluded simply by shaking hands (Guiso et 
al., 2006). This thesis aims to extend the emerging research into the impact made by 
culture through examination of whether regional corruption norms manifested in alcohol 
consumption have a potential to result in corporate tax avoidance. Despite the 
government’s efforts and policies to crack down on tax avoidance, firms remain 
aggressive in avoiding tax. This motivates scholars to further study on the determinants 
of tax avoidance. My study suggests that under a weak institutional environment, the 
enforcement of tax laws and regulations without a corresponding effort to combat 
alcohol-related sin culture is less likely to be effective. From a tax policy point of view, 
my results suggest that policymakers ought to give more consideration to the possible 
role played by informal culture when examining corporate behavior. 
 
One aspect of culture that first entered the economic literature is trust, which can support 
collective actions in business activities and facilitate transactions. As argued by 
Tabellini (2010), “good” culture such as trust can drive economic development 
measured by GDP per capita and GDP growth. Another commonly studied aspect of 
culture is religion. Scholars discover that religion can exert effect on government quality, 
economic attitudes, creditors’ rights and corporate decisions (La Porta et al. 1999; Guiso 
et. al. 2003; Stulz and Williamson, 2003; Hilary and Hui, 2009). As indicated by recent 
study of the impact of regional religiosity on the corporate activities, corporate tax 
planning strategies are shaped under the influence from religious beliefs held in the 
community where the firm is headquartered (McGuire et al. 2012). The finance 
literature also documents that investors have a preference to make investments in firms 
that are near them and have CEOs with similar cultural background (e.g., Grinblatt and 
Keloharju, 2001). Guiso et al. (2008) make an argument that investors are more willing 
to participate in the stock market when they place more trust in the market. Nevertheless, 
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although culture can exert a positive influence on many aspects of our economy, the 
negative externalities of some culture aspects have received little attention from 
previous literature. Recently, scholars start to study the impact made by sin culture, 
which leads to a discovery that in regions where gambling is deemed more acceptable, 
managers will seek more aggressive financial reporting (Christensen, 2018). My study 
is aimed at extending this emerging research into the negative externalities of culture by 
examining the impact of regional corruption norms manifested in alcohol consumption 
on corporate tax avoidance under the background of weak institutional environment 
across China.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
 
Corruption norms have a potential to make adverse impact on society. As indicated by 
the prior studies, corruption exacerbates the spread of a wide range of unethical behavior 
such as corporate earnings manipulation for financial and tax reporting purposes (Liu X. 
2016, Debacker et al. 2015). I choose China as my setting for empirical investigation 
into the impact made by corruption norms on corporate tax avoidance for multiple 
reasons. Firstly, China is considered as a typical country with high level of corruption 
since its economy is characterized by government control and underdeveloped formal 
institution (Fan et al. 2008). Following the economic reforms carried out in 1978, 
corruption has become so rampant in China that the government has admitted to the fact 
that corruption is now worse than any previous period and has permeated every aspect 
of society, such as politics, economy, ideology and culture (Wedeman, 2012). Secondly, 
since religion has played a less essential role in China’s history, informal institution 
such as social norms that govern the behaviors of people in their daily life appear to be 
more predominant. Finally, my single-country setting provides robust evidence that is 
subject to smaller problems of endogeneity and omitted variables (such as legal systems) 
bias compared to cross-country studies. Therefore, I end up choosing China as my 
setting to perform study on the effect of corruption norms on corporate immoral 
activities such as tax avoidance. 
Corruption norm is manifested in various aspects in Chinese society. Despite this, it 
remains abstract and difficult to measure. Cai et al. (2011) use entertainment and travel 
costs incurred to Chinese firms for inference to be made of corruption. Considering that 
such costs, measured at the firm level, are prone to the potential endogeneity, I choose 
to use alcohol consumption, measured at the regional level, to infer corruption culture. 
Anecdotal evidence indicates the association between corruption norms and illegitimate 
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corporate behavior. For example, it is common for Chinese executives to splurge public 
money on banquets – especially drinking – to connect with important clients and 
government officials in an effort to seek rents or to ensure that their business operations 
run smoothly.1 Li et. al (2016) argue that alcoholic drinking symbolizes sin culture that 
can exert a significant influence on corporate behavior in China since it facilitates the 
shaping of relational or network ties, which is crucial for firms to conduct business when 
their contracts and property rights cannot be protected by formal institutions. They find 
that Chinese firms in those regions with a more prominent alcohol consumption are in 
general association with more earnings management. In my study, I utilize a measure 
that employs geographic variations in the attitude towards alcohol consumption to 
determine whether alcohol-based corruption culture has any potential impact on 
corporate tax avoidance activities. 
To examine the research question, I use annual alcohol consumption per capita to proxy 
the prevalence of alcohol-related corruption norms in a region and the effective tax rate 
(ETR) that equals the total income tax expense divided by pretax accounting income as 
the main measure of tax avoidance. I manually extract provincial alcohol consumption 
data from the annual China Statistical Yearbook. Other data for tax avoidance and 
control variables are sourced from the China Stock Market Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) database. In case of any missing data for certain variables, I manually collect 
them from the corporate annual reports. In addition, I extract regional economic 
development and demographic data from the CEIC database. My sample covers 14,511 
observations and 2,169 unique firms in the period 2004-2013.  
My results reveal that firms in the regions with a high level of alcohol-based corruption 
norms have strong motivations to avoid income taxes as evident in lower ETRs. Using 
regional annual temperatures as the instrumental variable to reduce the endogeneity 
concern, I continue to find a significant and negative coefficient on the predicted alcohol 
consumption measure, which could confirm my prediction that alcohol-based corruption 
norms lead to higher likelihood of corporate tax avoidance. Additional studies discover 
that such an effect is more prevalent among small and privately owned firms, firms with 
higher stocks and option based managerial compensations, firms with higher statutory 
                                                          
1A cadre in Shaoguan City, Guangdong Province, died of alcoholism.As a result, the corruption of two 
local Party Committee secretaries, was brought to light. According to a report from Guiyang government, 
the former director of Baiyun District Bureau of Land and Resources spent a huge amount of business 
hospitality fees, and the cost of purchasing high-grade liquor reached more than 2 million yuan per year, 
averaging more than 6,000 yuan per day. (http://pzh.newssc.org/system/20141106/001529437.html) 
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tax rates and lower amounts of government subsidy, firms in regions with a poor 
institutional environment, and firms exposed to insufficient government and media 
scrutiny. The main result is also robust after adding corporate governance variables for 
further control. Using other measures of tax avoidance (i.e., cash ETR and long-term 
ETR), other measure for alcohol consumption (i.e., the HighAlcohol dummy), and other 
forms of sin culture (i.e., tobacco consumption and gambling attitudes), I also obtain 
consistent results.  
There are three significant contributions made in my study. Firstly, I contribute to the 
literature that examines the effects social norms or cultural forces exert on economic 
and financial activities. Existing literature has documented that the cultural aspects such 
as trust and religion can make an impact on macro-economy and financial market 
(Putnam, 1993; Stulz and Williamson, 2013; Bottazzi. Da Rin, 2016). My study help 
extend this emerging line of studies on the interactions between culture and 
organizational behaviors by starting with report on the influence exerted by alcohol 
consumption attitude as a specific corruption culture dimension in corporate tax 
strategies. My study also improves the methodologies applied in the previous studies on 
cultural impact by conducting an instrumental variable test to mitigate endogeneity 
problems (DeBacker et al. 2012). 
Secondly, my results make contribution to the literature on the determinants of corporate 
tax avoidance. Prior studies find that tax avoidance is associated with formal institutions 
across countries (Atwood et al. 2012). However, there are quite few studies connecting 
informal social norms or cultural aspects with tax avoidance and my study fill this gap 
by introducing a new determinant of tax avoidance, which is alcohol-based corruption 
norms.  
Thirdly, my thesis has a close relation to the emerging literature on corruption using 
objective data rather than perception-based data such as surveys (Fan, et.al, 2012; 
Caprio et al., 2013; DeBaker et.al, 2015). I use regional alcohol consumption data 
collected from China Statistical Yearbook to measure corruption norms, which also 
shapes new insights into the corruption literature, as it helps open up the black box of 
corruption by making identification that local drinking culture plays a role in breeding 
a climate of corruption in the transition period of Chinese society. 
From a policy perspective, my results suggest that when corruption norms are prevailing, 
a country is required to adopt a stronger tax enforcement to deter corporate tax 
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avoidance activities as corruption norms can act as substitute for formal institution 
loopholes and may induce corporate tax avoidance incentives. In other words, tightening 
government regulations will be necessary in the regions where corruption norms are 
prevalent. However, on the other hand, Lin et al.(2018) find that collusion with the 
government can make regulations such as tax enforcement less effective. Therefore the 
government needs concurrent efforts to combat alcohol-related corruption norms. 
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents a discussion on the institutional 
environment and hypothesis development. Chapter 3 outlines my sample and research 
design. Chapter 4 elaborates on the key findings and the results obtained from additional 
tests. Chapter 5 reveals the results derived from robustness tests. The concluding chapter 
lists research limitations and makes suggestions regarding the areas of future research. 
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Chapter 2 Institutional Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Institutional background 
Chinese alcohol history dates back to 800 years ago and alcohol currently is still playing 
a significant role on various social occasions such as business banquet across the country. 
2Drinking enjoys high social acceptance across the country (Cochrane et al., 2003). 
China has recently experienced drastic increases in the consumption of high-end spirits. 
Liquor is a banquet drink with typical Chinese characteristics and is often deemed 
indispensable at high-end banquets. Maotai and Wuliangye have earned their status as 
China’s national wines consumed by the Chinese government officials at all levels as 
well as the army for banquets. There are at least dozens of authentic Maotai liquors 
catered specially for the Bank of China, the Agricultural Bank of China, the Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China, the Ministry of Railways, the Beihai Fleet, the Golf 
Members, which demonstrates the important role played by alcohol, especially the high-
end alcohol, in Chinese business and government social activities. 
Scholars also find other roles of alcohol beyond stress reliever. For example, 
Pendergrass and Ostrove (1986) made a discovery that there is no connection between 
stressful work conditions and increased alcohol consumption by police officers, but the 
increased level of alcohol consumption was found to have connection with shifts in work 
settings that change the opportunities for socialization and interactions. Through 
experiments, psychological studies also find that alcohol consumption can increase 
social bonding, which can be regarded as “guanxi” in Chinese setting and can be seen 
as the hotbed of corruption. (Sayette, M. A.,et al. (2012). ) While drinking is socially 
acceptable, excessive drinking is viewed as adverse to moral cultivation at personal level 
and a cause of various social problems such as traffic accidents, suicides, sexually 
transmitted infection, violent crime and property crime (Cochrane et al., 2003). Girodo 
(1991) argues that alcohol consumption can be regarded as an expected social behavior 
in the process of meeting and establishing credibility with criminal community. In 
addition to that, he identifies a connection between drug/alcohol abuse and amount of 
undercover work accumulated by government officials due to the shared personality 
traits such as impulsivity, emotionality, and undisciplined self-image. Oasis Kodila-
                                                          
2 Alcohol market is an important industry in Chinese economy. According to the data for 2018, the total 
sales revenue of  the liquor industry in China totaled 812.274 billion yuan, an increase of 10.2% over the 
same period of last year, and the total profits reached 147.645 billion yuan, an increase of 23.92% over 
the same period of last year. 
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Tedika et. al (2012) apply cross national data and reach a conclusion that alcohol 
consumption bears a significant positive correlation with the level of corruption. Under 
the Chinese setting, Cai et al.  (2011) find out that in an “eat and drink” government, the 
entertainment and travel costs incurred to companies with alcohol consumption as the 
major component is a proxy of firm-level corruption. As discovered by Li et al. (2016), 
firms located in regions where alcohol-based sin culture plays a more prominent role 
have a higher likelihood to conduct dishonest activities such as earnings management. 
In my study, I examine whether alcohol-based corruption norms lead to illicit corporate 
behaviour in the weak institutional environment of China. 
2.2 Hypothesis development 
Despite years of research and billions of dollars in government revenue loss due to 
corporate tax avoidance, we remain lacking in understanding of the factors that may 
lead managers to aggressively avoid paying their corporate taxes. Prior studies have 
come into a generic conclusion that economic models focusing on opportunity and 
penalties of tax avoidance provide only part of the story to our understanding of tax 
compliance choices made by taxpayers. Alm et al. (1992), Alm et al. (1999), Jackson 
and Milliron (1986) and Wenzel (2005) suggest that social norms and ethical beliefs 
play a crucial role in influencing tax behavior. Blanthorne and Kaplan (2008) use 
structural equation modeling to put the relation among the underreporting opportunities, 
social norms, ethical beliefs and underreporting behavior on test. As revealed by their 
results, social norms, through ethical beliefs, could have an indirect effect on tax evasion 
intentions and behavior. This is because that top executives such as CEOs play a crucial 
role in deciding the corporate tax strategies, for which tax avoidance can be regarded as 
indicative of the preferences and attitudes held by CEO  (Tien-Shih Hsieh, 2018). 
Through social interactions, regional culture produces a spillover effect on not only 
CEOs but also all the other staff members involved in tax planning (Dane, 2018). Thus, 
cultural aspects and local social norms can make an impact on organizational behavior 
such as tax avoidance.  
In comparison, the cultural aspects with a potential to affect tax avoidance are generally 
not well understood. Despite this, recent research has started to perform study of this 
issue in a cross-country setting. For example, when conducting analysis of tax morale 
and the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes, Torgler (2003) find that trust in government, 
pride, and religiosity exert a positive and significant influence on tax morale and can 
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reduce the motivation of tax avoidance by firms. Based on the survey data sourced from 
the World Bank, Bame-Aldred et al. (2012) conclude that national cultures including 
assertiveness, individualism, and achievement all have a crucial impact on tax evasion. 
Using a sample of multinational firms from 25 countries, Lee et al. (2018) find out that 
societal trust exhibits a negative relation to tax avoidance. However, the cultural aspect 
can also have externalities on corporate tax planning activities. Using the Corruption 
Perception Index created by Transparency International, DeBaker et al. (2012) discover 
that firms with owners from countries with a higher corruption level have a tendency to 
evade more taxes. To add to this emerging literature that examines the correlation 
between negative cultural forces and corporate tax decisions, I choose to concentrate on 
the impact made by corruption norms on corporate tax avoidance.  
Similar in other government sectors, corruption is equally prevalent in tax 
administration as tax officials in a particular region can exercise discretionary power 
when dealing with tax issues with local firms (Shah A. 2007). As claimed by Hanlon 
and Heitzman (2010), tax avoidance represents a continuum of tax planning strategies 
where something like municipal bond investments are at one end (lower explicit tax rate, 
perfectly legal), the terms such as “noncompliance” and “evasion” (illegal activities)  
would be closer to the other end of the continuum. The decision whether to regard tax-
planning activity as legal or illegal is left primarily to the discretion of tax officers, 
which gives rise to a large grey area. Consequently, regional drinking culture may have 
an impact on the “under the table” interactions between local firms and local tax officials. 
The social activities with the corresponding government officials allow the firm to 
receive more preferential treatments from the government through collusion, which 
makes them more motivated to engage in tax avoidance activities (Tian and Fan, 2018). 
It can be imagined that when government officials are well-treated at the dining table, 
they are more likely to connive immoral or even illegal corporate activities. 3 
Consequently, I make use of the variations in alcohol consumptions across regions 
within China to determine whether alcohol-based corruption norms would affect the 
                                                          
3Dining tables have become intermediaries for corruption in China. It is reported that hotel owners have 
contracted a large number of government projects, banqueting the main leaders of the town government, 
walking in the gray zone of interest transmission. Once the string of discipline and rules is loosened on 
the wine table, people's greed will grow and they tend to play a variety of edge ball or even take risks. 
Cadres regards the banquet as a knocking brick for profit and design the meal as a channel for expanding 
their social network, thus fall into the corruption trap (http://opinion.people.com.cn/n/2015/0918/c1003-
27601393.html) 
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managerial incentives in tax avoidance activities. The hypothesis suggested by me is as 
follows: 
H1:  Firms headquartered in regions where alcohol-related corruption culture dominates 
are more likely to avoid taxes than firms in other regions. 
However, there may be differing views on the impact of alcoholic drinking as suggested 
in some studies. For example, using the data from U.S counties, Iftekhar et al. (2017) 
find out that firms headquartered in high-social-capital regions are more likely to behave 
in a way that conforms to the prescribed civic norms and meets the expectations of peers 
on tax compliance in that area. Although there are plenty of cases in relation to “dining 
table corruption”, alcohol also plays a crucial role in the normal social life of ordinary 
Chinese people. Thus, healthy drinking culture is conducive to enhancing normal social 
capital in local area and reducing firms’ motivation to avoid tax. Despite my prediction 
of an directional effect, with the above conflicting views taken into account, whether 
regional alcohol consumption attitude bears positive association with corporate tax 
avoidance is an empirical question. 
2.3 Cross sectional analysis: Managerial incentives 
To gain a better understanding of the channels through which alcohol-based corruption 
norms affect corporate tax avoidance, I also carry out investigation into cross-sectional 
factors that are possible to play a significant role in the relationship between the two. 
Moreover, if I can get different results between the two subgroups, the cross sectional 
analysis can help to reduce the endogeneity problems from the common micro-level 
economic factors. 
As managers set the tone at the top, I expect managerial incentives to influence corporate 
tax planning activities. In H2a, I conduct examination of the disparities in the association 
between corruption norms and corporate tax avoidance of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) versus non-SOEs. As revealed by the studies, companies’ political connections 
substitute for their incentive to collude with government officials (Tian and Fan, 2018). 
SOEs are frequent to have their economic interests shared with the government, as a 
result of which they are faced with more political pressure to bear administrative and 
social responsibility for the government as compared to non-SOEs (Shen et al. 2008; Li 
and Zhou, 2005). Consequently, SOEs are likely to deviate from the objective of 
maximizing corporate profits in order to fulfill the political appeals and various social 
obligations, for which SOEs have little incentive to avoid tax. SOEs may be even willing 
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to pay more tax to please the local government for the purpose of better publicity (Li 
and Zhou, 2005). On the other hand, non-SOEs have limited political connections and 
considerations may be reliant on more after-work drinks with bureaucrats to gain 
business favors from them. Therefore, their tax avoidance activities tend to be subjected 
to more influence from the corruption culture in their region. Based on the above 
analysis, the following hypothesis are proposed: 
 
H2a: The positive effect of alcohol-based corruption culture on corporate tax avoidance 
is more pronounced among non-SOEs compared to SOEs. 
 
Regarding firm size, Rice (1992) argues that large publicly-traded companies have 
higher compliance as these companies are more likely to have managers who are 
independent of its owners, and may not risk tax avoidance for the sake of making profit 
for shareholders. On another hand, as suggested by Slemrod (2004), distinct from large 
firms where tax planning decisions are often devolved, small firms may behave more 
like individuals as the business owner can make tax decisions on their own. In addition, 
large firms are subjected to more government intervention and bear high political costs, 
for which they could make greater loss than small firms by discouraging government 
actions through lower net income reporting. The result is, large firms have lower 
incentives to avoid tax (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). From the above analysis, an 
argument can be made that managerial incentives to avoid tax tend to be higher in small 
firms than in large firms. So, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
H2b: The positive effect of alcohol-based corruption culture on tax avoidance is more 
pronounced among small firms compared to large firms. 
 
In respect to CEO compensation, Coles et al. (2006) suggest that compensation such as 
stocks and options is conducive to aligning the incentives of managers with the interests 
of shareholders, which provides motivation for managers to make corporate decisions 
on behalf of shareholders as managers share gains and losses with 
shareholders. Moreover, Coles et al. (2006) find out that convexity in compensation 
could make risk perceived as more valuable by managers, which gives them incentive 
to implement riskier investment and financial policies. For instance, Agrawal and 
Mandelker (1987) suggest that firms with higher stock plus option ownership invest in 
more variance-increasing acquisitions. As claimed by Crocker and Slemrod (2005), 
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shareholders can change the compensation contracts with their executives to induce tax 
evasion on their behalf. Therefore, CEOs with higher stock and option based 
compensation tend to perform more risky activities such as tax avoidance for their 
maximum benefit. According to the above analysis, the following hypothesis is raised: 
 
H2c: The positive effect of alcohol-based corruption culture on tax avoidance is more 
pronounced among firms with higher stock and option based compensation for their 
CEOs. 
 
Statutory rate is also viewed as an influencing factor in firm’s tax avoidance motivation. 
In China, the corporate statutory tax rate is normally 25%. In comparison, the high and 
new technology enterprises are entitled to a 15% tax rate. As revealed by studies, firms 
subject to a higher statutory rate have higher motivation to avoid tax compared with 
firms that can benefit from a lower statutory rate (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Fisman 
and Wei, 2004). Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H2d: The positive effect of alcohol-based corruption culture on tax avoidance is more 
pronounced among firms with a higher statutory tax rate. 
 
To facilitate firm growth and promote state-encouraged industries, the government often 
choose to subsidize some firms in the forms of tax rebates, R&D tax credits etc. Despite 
the specific guidelines for governments to grant subsidies, how much to grant to which 
firms are to be decided by the officials (Firth et al., 2014). Companies with more 
government subsidies can be regarded as government-favored companies. These 
companies have relatively low financial stress, which translates to less incentives for 
them to engage in tax avoidance activities. Thus, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
 
H2e: The positive effect of alcohol-based corruption culture on corporate tax avoidance 
is more pronounced among firms with less government subsidies. 
 
2.4 Cross sectional analysis: Interactions with formal institutions 
Next, I take the interaction between informal cultures and formal institutions into 
account as Atwood et al. (2012) discover that firms avoid less taxes in countries 
governed by the higher quality governments. Lee et al. (2018) also find out that the 
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effect social norms have is more limited when institutions are more powerful. This is 
because when formal institution is in a stronger position, the legal framework is better 
established and the policies are better formulated and more reliably enforced, for which 
there will be less loopholes to exploit for the purpose of tax avoidance. Therefore, 
corruption norms can be constrained and firms will be left with less opportunity to avoid 
tax through under-the-table activities. The reform process in China exhibits a significant 
uneven development of institutions across provinces (Démurger et al. 2012). In a weaker 
institutional environment where contracts are not receiving sufficient protection, firms 
may be forced to have excessive reliance on “guanxi” or “network ties” with the 
government or business partners that are shaped at the dining table. According to the 
survey report published by the World Bank (2006), government quality varies across 
120 marjor cities in China. In order to examine the mitigating influence of local 
governments, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H3: The positive effect of alcohol-based corruption culture on tax avoidance is more 
pronounced among firms headquartered in areas with low government quality. 
 
2.5 Cross sectional analysis: External scrutiny from the media and government  
Finally, I give consideration to the impact made by external scrutiny on the relationship 
between corruption norms and corporate tax avoidance. As discovered by prior studies, 
firms engage in less aggressive tax planning activities when they are subjected to greater 
external scrutiny from tax authorities (Hoopes et al. 2012). Lin et al. (2018) find out that 
although there is uniform tax laws in China, tax enforcement often deviates from the 
prescribed law and varies across different regions. Following Lin et al. (2018), I predict 
that the scrutiny of tax authority has deterrence effect on corporate tax avoidance and 
the more stringent tax enforcement environments disencourages tax noncompliance. 
The media also imposes scrutiny on corporate tax reporting. Firth et al. (2014) find out 
that firms whose controlling shareholders have been included on the Hurun Rich List 
have a much higher possibility to be investigated, arrested, and charged by the 
government owning to their suspicious wealth accumulation process. In addition, they 
find out that the public pressure often causes firm managers to maintain a low profile 
by concealing their profits through negative earnings management. Wu and Ye (2017) 
find out that auditors give more conservative opinions on firms whose publicity 
increases due to their controlling shareholders’ presence on the Hurun Rich List. Thus, 
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I expect firms with more publicity to be less likely to take aggressive tax positions. Thus, 
the final hypothesis is suggested as follows: 
 
H4: The positive effect alcohol-based corruption culture has on tax avoidance is less 
pronounced among firms that are subjected to greater external scrutiny from the tax 
authority and the media. 
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Chapter 3 Sample and Research Methodologies 
3.1 Sample selection 
I manage to extract all of the A-share firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges from 2004 to 2013. I manually collect the province-level alcohol 
consumption data from China Statistical Yearbook, which is compiled by National 
Bureau of Statistics of China on an annual basis starting from 1999. My sample period 
stretches from 2004 to 2013 as the China Statistical Yearbook provided the province-
level alcohol consumption data in a separate way from 2004 to 2013. The annual 
financial data is sourced from the CSMAR database while the regional economic 
development data and demographic data are accessed through the CEIC database. 
In order to acieve a meaningful interpretation of the results, the following firm-year 
observations are excluded: (1) observations from financial industries (because they use 
different accounting standards) (2) observations with a *ST or *PT symbol (because 
when a firm is designated as ST or PT, it is in poor financial conditions and thus facing 
the risk of being delisted), (3) observations with negative shareholders’ equity, (4) 
observations with a negative effective tax rate, and (5) observations with missing 
information. I winsorize the top and bottom one percentile of all continuous variables 
to avoid the influence of outliers. As a result of the screening process, the final sample 
is comprised of 14,511 firm-year observations and 2,169 unique firms. 
3.2 Regression model and variable definitions 
3.2.1 Model specification 
In H1, it is believed that firms headquartered in regions where alcohol-related corruption 
culture dominates are more likely to evade income taxes. To validate this likelihood, the 
tax avoidance measure (i.e., ETR) is regressed on the variables of interest, a set of firm 
characteristics, and some regional control variables. Industry and year fixed effect are 
also introduced to mitigate the problem associated with unobserved variables over time 
and across industries. The baseline empirical model is as follows. 
𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐴𝑙𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑍 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                        (1)                                                                            
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Where i and t denote firm and year, respectively. The dependent variable, Avoidance, is 
the annual GAAP ETR, which is purposed to measure a firm’s proficiency in reducing 
its tax liability relative to its pretax result and thus indicate the relative tax burden across 
firms. The variable of interest is Alcohol_Consumption, referring to the average alcohol 
consumption per capita in a region where the firm is headquartered. Z represents a series 
of control variables, including both firm characteristics and regional characteristics that 
will be introduced in the later sections. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 
top and bottom 1% to reduce the effects of outliers. All regressions including industry 
(2012 CSRC industry classification) and year fixed effects are estimated with the 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, which are clustered by firms to prevent serial 
correlation in the residual. A negative and statistically significant coefficient on 
Alcohol_Consumption suggests that the firms with their headquarters located in a high 
alcohol consumption area tend to have lower ETRs, which are indicative of higher tax 
avoidance.  
To conduct the cross-sectional analysis of Hypotheses 2 to 4, the sample is split into two 
subgroups based on the median of the cross-sectional factors for testing, prior to the 
separate re-estimation of equation (1) for the two subgroups. 
3.2.2 Tax avoidance measure 
Further with prior research (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; Armstrong et al. 2012), GAAP 
ETR (annual) is applied as the main tax avoidance measure, which equals the total tax 
expense divided by pretax income. In order to facilitate the interpretation of ETRs, any 
value greater than 1 is reset to 1. Despite the extensive use of GAAP ETR in corporate 
tax avoidance literature and its capability of indicating non-conforming tax avoidance, 
it continues to encounter a variety of problems such as earnings management. Therefore, 
the alternative measures are taken as robustness test for description in Section 5.  
 
 
3.2.3 Corruption culture measure 
The previous literature documents multiple measures of corruption, such as micro-level 
subjective surveys (Fan, Titman and Twite, 2012), country-level corruption perception 
indices (DeBaker et al. 2015), state/province level convictions of abused public officials 
etc. (Glaeser and Raven, 2006). Recently, there is a trend for scholars to use more 
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objective data for better corruption measures, Cai et al. (2011) proposes the use of 
entertainment and travel costs (including entertainment expenses such as drinking, 
eating, gifts, karaoke etc. and travel expenditures) as an appropriate alternative measure 
of corruption among the Chinese enterprises. They take the view that these costs are 
associated with grease money being spent to obtain premium service, protection money 
for lower tax expense and more importantly, to shape relational capital with related 
parties. Tian and Fan (2018) also take these costs as a measure of firm-level corruption, 
which leads to the findings that firms with more entertainment and travel costs have 
higher incentive to avoid taxes. However, there is a certain proportion of the 
entertainment and the travel costs is tax-deductible, so that this corruption measure is 
not suitable for my tax avoidance studies.4 Besides, entertainment and travel costs are 
endogenously dependent on firm characteristics. Considering this, I will not use these 
costs as my corruption measure in this study. 
In a weak institutional environment such as China, social norms are likely to play a quite 
significant role in influencing corporates decisions. For instance, a recent study carried 
out by Yang and Zhao (2018) reveals that regional rice collectivism culture, which is a 
unique constituent of Chinese cultural, has effects on corporate corruption behaviors 
from both the demand-side of government officials and the supply-side of corporate 
managers. Specifically, they draw conclusions that firms are more inclined to engage in 
corruption when they are surrounded by wheat individualism culture and their CEOs 
come from rice collectivism culture. On another hand, by using another cultural aspect 
as the measure for corruption,  Li et al. (2016) find that alcohol-based sin culture leads 
to increased corporate earnings management. Drawing on the insights derived from 
these studies, I measure corruption culture based on the regional alcohol consumption 
level where the firm is headquartered. There are several advantages related to this 
measure for corruption. First, many anecdotal evidence support that corruption can be 
buried in the drinking culture in China. Second, by using objective data extracted from 
authoritative data source, this measure can avoid the subjective judgement problem 
related to the perception-based measure for corruption.Third, using the regional data can 
reduce firm-level endogeneity problems.                                            
                                                          
4 Article 43 of the Regulations for the Implementation of Corporate Tax Law: Business entertainment 
expenses incurred by a firm during its production and business activities shall be deducted at 60% of the 
total amount incurred, but the maximum deduction amount shall not exceed 5‰ of the annual sales 
(business) income in that year. 
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3.2.4 Control variables 
Following the previous literature on the determinants of tax avoidance, firm Size (log 
total equity) is factored in for control over economies of scale; ROA (net profit/total 
asset) is to control firm profitability, Leverage (long-term liability/total asset), MBRatio 
(market value of equity plus book value of debt/book value of total assets), PPE (net 
fixed asset balance/total asset), Inventory (net inventory balance/total asset) and 
Intangibles (net intangibles balance/total asset) are to control firm complexity, and 
Cash_ratio (cash and cash equivalents/ total asset) is to control firm liquidity. Besides, 
corporate tax avoidance is also affected by regional economic conditions, for which 
GDP per capita and GDP growth are subjected to control as well. (e.g. Rego 2003; 
Dyreng et al. 2008; Frank et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2010). Moreover, consideration is 
given to provincial-level demographic variables analyzed by World Health Organization 
(2014) and Shervin (2016) as the potential determinants of alcohol consumption at an 
individual level: gender and education. These variables are exploited to control for 
potential regional level omitted variables correlated with alcohol consumption (my 
variable of interest). Consequently, the demographic determinants including gender and 
education are added to ensure the impact on corporate tax avoidance is made by local 
drinking culture rather than other underlying factors (Boone et al. 2012). The 
demographic variables are defined as follow: Male is the proportion of males in the 
province where the firm is headquartered, and the education attainment (Education) is 
defined as the proportion of people with a minimum of one year spent in college in the 
corresponding province.   
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Chapter 4 Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all of the variables applied in the regression 
model. As indicated by the results, the average ETR is 20.2% for firms. The average 
alcohol consumption per capita among all region-years is approximately ¥229. In terms 
of firm characteristics, the average ROA of my sample is 4.9%, the average leverage 
ratio is 6.9%, the mean fixed asset as a percentage of total assets is 25.3%, and the mean  
inventory and intangible asset ratios are 16.7% and 4.3% of the total asset, respectively. 
These statistics are broadly consistent with those reported in the previous studies (e.g., 
Li et al., 2016; Lin et al., 2018). 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
Table 2 displays the average ETRs across different industries. It reveals that agriculture, 
forestry, and fishery industries have the lowest ETRs with an average of 10.3%, while 
the private education sector has the highest rate of 29.3%. The difference in ETRs across 
industries is reflective of different tax preferential policies adopted for different 
industries. This accounts for the need to add industry fixed effect to the regression model. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
Table 3 shows the distribution of various proxies for sin culture across provinces in 
China. Beijing and Hainan are observed to have the highest and lowest alcohol 
consumption per capita, respectively. Also, it appears that people living in colder areas 
such as Beijing and Tianjin tend to consume more alcohol than people living in warmer 
areas such as Hainan and Yunnan. Overall, there is sufficient variation regarding the 
level of alcohol consumption across regions to test its effect on corporate tax behavior.  
(Insert Table 3 here) 
Table 4 shows the Pearson correlations among the variables. From this table, it can be 
seen that the alcohol and tobacco measures bear reasonably high correlations with each 
other, suggesting that they are capturing the similar sin culture. In addition, as predicted 
in H1, alcohol is negatively correlated with all the three measures of tax avoidance. 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
4.2 Main empirical results 
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Moving on to the multivariate tests, the results in Table 5 Columns (1) and (2) provide 
additional support for H1. Regressing ETR on AlcoholPerCapita and a set of control 
variables leads to the discovery that the coefficient on Alcohol_Consumption is negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% level. The result is consistent with my hypothesis 
that the more dominance of corrupt drinking culture in a region is associated with higher 
extent of tax avoidance activities. As for the economic significance of these results, the 
estimated coefficient on AlcoholPerCapita indicates that when the per capita alcohol 
spending increases by ¥ 1, there is a 0.0024% 5lower effective tax rate paid by local 
firms. Given that the average pre-tax income among listed company is ¥542,000,000 
and the ETR is 20.2% on average, the effect of regional alcohol-based corruption culture 
can translate into a ¥2,627 decline per year in tax expense for an average firm. 
Consequently, this effect appears to be of economic significance in explaining the 
occurrence of corporate tax avoidance. 
Imported corruption norms analysis  
As argued by DeBacker et. al. (2012), how social norms affect corporate tax planning 
activities depends on the one that performs the tax filing functions and identifying that 
owners’ imported corruption culture has an impact on corporate tax evasion.6 To control 
the imported alcohol-based corruption norms from other culture of CEOs’ home regions, 
in equation (1) I add CEO_Alcohol, that is defined as per capita alcohol spending in the 
CEO’s home region. As shown by the results in Table 5 Column (2), the coefficient on 
CEO hometown alcohol consumption proxy is insignificant. In contrast, the coefficient 
on regional alcohol consumption proxy remains negative and significant, implying that 
the CEO effect is absorbed by the regional effect. That is to say, firms are subjected to 
more influence from the surrounding environment where they operate instead of from 
the individual characteristics of their CEOs. This makes sense as people including 
corporate executives often adapt themselves to the customs and traditions typical of the 
area in which they are residing.  
Instrumental variable (2SLS) analysis 
In order to address the potential endogeneity and spurious correlation between 
                                                          
5 I use the natural logarithm of the alcohol consumption variable to estimate the regression in order to 
reduce the scale of the variables to make the data more stable. Consequentely, when interpreting the 
economic significance of the variable of interest, I adjust the original coefficient in the result by removing 
the natural logarithm effect to get the new coefficient, which is 0.0024%. 
6  I replace the regional alcohol consumption proxy with the CEO_Alcohol. The untabulated result 
indicates that the coefficient on CEO_Alcohol is significantly negative, which is consistent with the 
finding from DeBacker et. al. (2012). 
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corruption norms and tax avoidance, an instrumental variable method based on 
geographic “shock” is applied to examine the alcohol-related corruption norms. As 
revealed by recent studies, geographic/climate conditions can exert a significant 
influence on social norms (Ostrom, 1990; Durante, 2009). In term of drinking culture, 
“Global status report on alcohol and health” of World Health Organization shows that 
alcohol consumption is associated with regional temperatures, as people living in colder 
areas are inclined to drink more alcohol. Consequently, the provincial average 
temperatures are applied as an instrumental variable for regional alcohol consumption. 
The geographic variations are expected to significantly affect the local drinking culture. 
However, they are unlikely to have a direct impact on corporate tax behavior. Thus, 
regional temperature is treated as a reasonable instrument vaiable as it conforms to  
inclusion restrictions. However, the limitation of this instrumental variable is that it is 
hard to prove that regional temperature cannot affect tax avoidance through other 
channels other than alcohol consumption. Consequentely, this variable may not satisfy 
exclusion restriction and be regarded as a reasonable instrumental variable for my study. 
 
The regional temperature data is obtained from China Statistical Yearbook. The results 
in Table 5 Column (3) demonstrate that Temperature is significantly and negatively 
related to AlcoholPerCapita. Then, the estimated value of alcohol consumption from 
stage one regression is referenced as the instrument in the second stage to test my main 
hypothesis. The results presented in Column (4) indicates clearly that the predicted value 
of alcohol consumption bears significant and negative correlation with the tax avoidance 
measure, which validates the prediction I made previously.7 Consequently, this test is 
believed to provide additional support for my prediction that firms in regions where 
alcohol plays a more prominent role in social life attempt tax avoidance more. 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
4.3 Cross-sectional analysis: Managerial incentives 
SOE versus Non-SOE. To find the mitigating role of government ownership, the sample 
firms are classed into two groups based on whether the firm is owned by the state and 
separate regression analysis is conducted in equation (1) for each subgroup. As indicated 
by the results reported in Table 6 Columns 1 and 2, the association between alcohol-
                                                          
7 Moreover, when using cash ETR as my tax avoidance measure, the coefficient on the predicted value of 
alcohol consumption is still significantly negative. 
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based corruption norms and ETRs is negative and significant at the 1% level for the 
non-SOE firms, whereas the same association is negative but modestly significant (at 
the 10% level) among the SOE firms (although the F test results suggest no significant 
difference in coefficients between the two subsamples). Taken together, some evidence 
are found that the effect exerted by regional corruption norms is more pronounced for 
non-SOE firms as compared to SOE firms, which is consistent with my H2a. 
Large versus Small Firms.To examine the mitigating effect of firm size, the sample is 
split at the median of firms’ total assets, prior to separate re-estimation of equation (1) 
for the two subsamples. The results presented in Table 6 Columns (3) and (4) reveal that 
the association of alcohol-based corruption norms with corporate tax avoidance is 
focused on the subsample of smaller firms and the coefficient differences between the 
two groups is significant. This result proves consistent with H2b that the positive effect 
alcohol-based corruption culture has on corporate tax avoidance is more notable among 
small firms as compared to large firms. 8 
(Insert Table 6 here)  
Low versus High CEO Compensation. To examine the effect of compensation on CEOs’ 
incentive to avoid tax, the sample is divided into high and low compensation groups 
based on the median stock-based compensation paid to the CEOs in the total sample. 
The results in Table 7 Columns (1) and (2) suggest that the association between alcohol-
based corruption norms and ETRs is significantly more negative for firms with CEOs 
receiving higher stock and option based compensation, which proves consistent with the 
prediction of H2c. Overall, the cross-sectional test provides some evidence showing that 
the impact made by alcohol-based corruption culture on tax avoidance is more 
noticeable when the CEO’s  compensation is linked to stocks. It implies that stock-based 
compensation may motivate managers to take aggressive tax positions and that 
corporate executives serve as an important mechanism to spread regional corruption 
norms in the firm.  
(Insert Table 7 here) 
Low versus High Statutory Tax Rate. To carry out investigation into whether different 
statutory tax rates affect tax avoidance incentive, the sample is categorized into low and 
                                                          
8 The difference between large and small firms can also be caused by factors such as geographic 
dispersion. Large firms have  more subsidiaries operating in other regions, so that their tax avoidance 
activities maybe less affected by headquarter regional effect.  
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high rate subgroups depending on the median tax rate of the sample. Subsequently, 
equation (1) is re-estimated for each subsample. The results shown in Table 8 Columns 
(1) and (2) demonstrate that the association between the variables of interest is negative 
and significant among firms with relatively higher statutory rate, which is consistent 
with the prediction of H2d. The difference in the coefficients of the two groups is also 
significant.  
 
Low versus High Government Subsidies. To test the impact of government subsidies on 
corporate tax incentives, the sample is divided into two subsamples based on the median 
value of government subsidies received by the firm. Table 8 Columns (3) and (4) suggest 
that the coefficient on AlcoholPerCapita is more negative for firms with low 
government subsidies, which is despite that the difference in the two coefficients is 
insignificant. Thus, there is some evidence to support H2e that the impact of alcohol-
based corruption culture is more noticeable for firms with low government subsidies. 
(Insert Table 8 here) 
4.4 Additional results: Interactions between formal institutions and informal institutions 
Low versus High Government Quality  
To examine the correlations between formal institutions such as government quality and 
informal institutions such as corruption norms, government effectiveness is taken as my 
government quality proxy. The government effectiveness data is sourced from a report 
published by the World Bank in 2006 titled “China - Governance, investment climate, 
and harmonious society: competitiveness enhancement for 120 cities in China”. The 
criteria for government effectiveness include: extent of state vs. private ownership, 
burden from taxed fees, labor redundancy, travel/entertainment expenditures, access to 
bank loans, bureaucratic time demands, and customs clearance. GovernEffectiveness is 
split by the median: regions above the median are classified as having a high government 
quality. With equation (1) re-estimated for each of the two subsamples, it is found out 
(Table 9 Columns 1 and 2) that the coefficient on AlcoholPerCapita is negative and 
significant exclusively for firms located in low government efficiency areas. Overall, 
the tests provide support to hypothesis 3 that the influence exerted by corruption culture 
on corporate tax avoidance decisions is more significant in the regions with institutional 
factors not put in place to discipline corporate misbehavior. 
(Insert Table 9 here) 
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4.5 Additional results: External scrutiny by the media and government 
Low versus High Tax Audit Rates. To test whether the scrutiny of tax authority mitigates 
the influences exerted by sin culture, the rate of tax audits is calculated at the regional 
level, and equals the number of tax returns audited divided by the number of tax returns 
filed in a region. The data is obtained from the China Tax Audits Yearbook, published 
annually by the State Administration of Taxation (SAT). The sample is divided at the 
median rate: regions above (below) the median are classified as high (low) audit rate 
regions. The results presented in Table 10 Columns (1) and (2) reveal that the coefficient 
on AlcoholPerCapita is negative and significant exclusively for firms in the regions with 
a low tax enforcement environment, which is consistent with the prediction of H4.  
Low versus High Publicity. To examine the scrutiny of the media, the sample is split 
into two subgroups: one with the firm’s owner being included on the Hurun Rich List in 
a particular year, and the other with the firm’s owner not being included on the list. 
Separate regressions are returned for each group. The results shown in Table 10 
Columns (3) and (4) indicate that the coefficient on AlcoholPerCapita is significantly 
negative only when firms have not attracted media attention.  
Overall, the result demonstrates that external scrutiny from both the government and the 
media constrains the effect of sin culture on corporate tax avoidance, which is consistent 
with what is predicted by H4. 
(Insert Table 10 here) 
Chapter 5 Robustness Tests 
5.1 Using a different measure for alcohol consumption 
While the use of a continuous variable avoids imposing a subjective and arbitrary cut-
off point, its use assumes a log-linear relation between the two variables. To 
accommodate a non-linear relationship between alcohol consumption and tax avoidance, 
an indicator variable is used for alcohol consumption. HighAlcohol is a dummy variable 
that equals one when the firm is headquartered in a province where per capita alcohol 
spending in a year is higher than the sample median of that year and zero otherwise. A 
higher HighAlcohol is indicative of a more dominant role played by alcohol in the social 
life of that region or a more tolerant attitude held towards alcohol consumption. The 
result shown in Table 11 reveals that the coefficient on HighAlcohol is negative and 
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statistically significant at the 1% level. As for the economic significance of the results, 
the estimated coefficient on HighAlcohol suggests that firms in areas with above-median 
corruption norms report an ETR that is 0.625% lower than that reported by other firms. 
With an average pre-tax income of ¥542,000,000 and an average ETR of 20.2% for the 
sample, this translates into a reduction in the tax expense of ¥684,275 for an average 
firm, indicating that this effect is of economic significance. 
(Insert Table 11 here) 
Moreover, I use another proxy for alcohol consumption to control for residents 
income. AlcoholRatio equals per capita annual average alcohol consumption in a 
region where the firm headquartered scaled by annual income per capita in that region, 
multiplied by 100. Consequentely, AlcoholRatio measures the percentage residents 
income spent on alcohol consumption. A higher AlcoholRatio indicates a more 
dominant role of drinking culture in a region. The result shown in Table 12 shows that 
the coefficient on AlcoholRatio is negative and statistically significant at 1% level, 
which is consistent with my original hypothesis. 
(Insert Table 12 here) 
5.2 Using different measures of tax avoidance 
Following Dyreng et al. (2008), I use long-term effective tax rate (Long-term ETR), 
which is calculated as the sum of  total tax expense over the current and preceding four 
years scaled by the sum of pretax book income net of special items over the 
corresponding period. The advantage of calculating ETRs over a five-year window is 
that it avoids year-to-year variations on annual tax rates and identifies firms that avoid 
tax in the long run (Chen et al. 2010). Secondly, I use cash ETR (CETR), which is 
computed as the paid cash taxes divided by the pretax income.9 Cash ETR is affected 
by tax deferral strategies, rather than by changes in tax accounting accruals, for which 
it can better avoid the impact of earnings management by firms (Mark Bradshaw, et. al., 
2018). A lower value of Long-term ETR and CETR indicates that firms are more 
aggressive in terms of tax avoidance. Table 1 indicates that the average CETR is 21.1%, 
and the Long-term ETR is 21.3% with less significant standard deviations compared to 
                                                          
9Due to non-disclosure of cash taxes paid in the database, I calculate cash income taxes paid as current 
tax expense plus beginning-of-year income taxes payable minus end-of-year income taxes payable. 
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the other tax avoidance measures. Table 13 presents the regression results of these two 
measures. 
(Insert Table 13 here) 
From Table 13, it can be seen that the coefficients on the two measures of alcohol 
consumption (AlcoholPerCapita, HighAlcohol) are significantly negative, which is 
consistent with the main results that alcohol-based corruption norms lead to an increase 
in corporate tax avoidance. 
5.3 Adding corporate governance control variables 
Recently, there are studies revealing that the characteristics of corporate governance 
have an impact on tax avoidance activities. As argued by Zemzem et. al. (2013), 
independent non-executive directors can be seen as a balancing force in the board and 
their existence usually represents effective corporate governance. Thus, a higher 
independent directors ratio could reduce the likelihood of corporate tax misreporting 
substantially. They also find that duality of chairman and CEO positions induces tax 
avoidance. Richardson et.al. (2016) find out that voting rights and cash flow rights 
divergence can exert effect on the level of tax avoidance activities. Therefore, I rerun 
my analysis controlling for corporate governance: CEO duality, board independence 
ratio, and separation of controlling right from voting right. Table 14 reveals that the 
coefficient on alcohol consumption remains negative and statistically significant with 
the involvement of the corporate governance control variables. When different measures 
of tax avoidance are used, the main results continue to hold.  
(Insert Table 14 here) 
5.4 Adding firm fixed effects 
To further address the endogeneity problem caused by unobserved firm-level factors, 
the firm fixed effects are added into equation (1) and the regression is returned by using 
different measures of tax avoidance. The results presented in Table 15 suggest that the 
coefficient on AlcohoPerCapita remains negative and significant, which is consistent 
with my previous prediction on the effect of alcohol-based corruption norms. 
(Insert Table 15 here) 
5.5 Investigating different forms of sin culture 
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Finally, the impact of other forms of sin culture on corporate tax avoidance is explored. 
The equation (1) is returned by replacing alcohol consumption measures with proxies 
for smoking-related sin culture (TobaccoPerCapita) as well as gambling-related sin 
culture (LotteryPerCapita). TobaccoPerCapita is defined as the per capita tobacco 
consumption per province and calculated as provincial tobacco consumption divided by 
provincial population. LotteryPerCapita is defined as the per capita lottery spending per 
province, and calculated as provincial lottery spending divided by provincial population. 
The regional tobacco consumption data and the lottery consumption data are sourced 
from China Statistical Yearbook.10 The regression results are reported in Table 16. It is 
found out that the association between different forms of sin culture and ETRs is 
negative and significant, suggesting a negative impact of sin culture measured by 
tobacco consumption and gambling attitude on tax compliance.11 
(Insert Table 16 here) 
5.6 The impact of anti-corruption campaign 
Examining the effect exerted by corruption norms is accompanied by two sources of 
endogeneity concern. Firstly, both tax avoidance and corruption norms could be affected 
by unobserved common factors. Secondly, despite corruption norms being exogenously 
determined, corporate headquarters location is decided by a firm. It is possible that tax-
avoiding firms choose to locate their headquarter in a more corrupt region (high alcohol 
consumption is caused by these firms clustering in a region). The 2012 countrywide 
anti-corruption campaign provides an interesting setting to address these two sources of 
endogeneity. In 2012, president Xi Jinping initiated a vigorous anti-corruption campaign. 
At the end of the first quarter of 2012, the government, the army, and SOEs started to 
impose restrictions on public consumptions and government expenditures. The  “alcohol 
bans during business hours” not only improved work style of officials, but also 
addressed dinner table corruption. The anti-corruption campaign produced notable 
effects in several related industries. Sales reveneues of high-end wines and international 
                                                          
10 Tobacco data is from 2004-2013, while Lottery data is from 2010-2017 since it is only complied in this 
period. 
11 In order to compare the positive impacts of different aspects of sin culture on corporate tax avoidance, 
I add alcohol consumption proxy, tobacco consumption proxy and gambling expense proxy in the same 
baseline regression model. The untabulated results find that only the coefficient on gambling proxy is 
negatively significant at 1% level, while the coefficient on drinking proxy and smoking proxy is not 
statistically significant. This indicates that gambling has more significant impact on corporate tax 
avoidance than other two sin culture aspects.Future studies can use a more comprehensive measure for 
sin culture by using principal component analysis on three sin culture aspects mentioned above. 
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spirits plunged in the wake of the campaign. A difference-in-differences (DID) design 
is used to examine the effect an exogenous shock has on corruption norms by adding a 
dummy variable, Post2012, and its interaction with the test variable 
(Alcohol_Consumption or HighAlcohol). 
Running separate regressions for AlcoholPerCapita and HighAlcohol leads to the 
following results (untabulated). The coefficients on the test variables alone are negative 
and significant. The coefficient on AlcoholPerCapita*Post2012 is negative but of no 
statistical insignificance. In comparison, the coefficient on HighAlcohol*Post2012 is 
positive and modestly significant (at the 10% level). Overall, the results appear to 
provide limited evidence on the deterrence effect of anti-corruption campaign on 
corporate tax avoidance. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion, Limitations and Future Research 
Corruption norm is a prevalent facet of culture across developing countries. Prior studies 
suggest that informal instituions such as corruption norms can shape corporate behaviors. 
This line of literature is added by investigating whether alcohol-based corruption norms 
in China contribute to corporate tax avoidance, providing empirical evidence to validate 
the anecdotal observation that suggests a relation between the two. As demonstrated by 
the preliminary results, ETRs are noticeably lower in firms headquartered in regions 
with high corruption norms proxied by the higher levels of alcohol consumption. By 
applying an instrumental variable method to capture geographic variations in alcohol 
consumption, I continue to find out about a significant and negative coefficient on the 
predicted alcohol consumption measure. Additional tests are conducted to discover that 
the impact made by alcohol-based corruption norms on corporate tax avoidance is more 
evident in firms with the following charactersitics: 1) private and small firms; 2) firms 
with high statutory tax rate and low government subsidies; 3) firms with high stock and 
option based CEO compensation; 4) firms in regions with low government quality; and 
5) firms with low scrutiny from the government and the media. The main findings are 
validated by a number of sensitivity tests, including using alternative measures of 
alcohol consumption and tax avoidance, using regional temperature as an instrument, 
adding corporate governance factors for further control,  adding firm fixed effect, and 
testing other forms of sin culture. Moreover, by utilizing the anti-corruption campaign 
as a shock to corruption norms to partly address the potential endogeneity issue, some 
evidence is found to be in line with my initial prediction. 
As revealed by the results. absent market-supporting institutions, the enforcement of tax 
laws and regulations without a corresponding effort to fight alcohol-related sin culture 
is less likely to achieve the intended result. From the perspective of tax policy, my 
results suggest that policymakers ought to give more consideration to the possible role 
played by informal culture when examining corporate behavior. 
This paper is subjected to certain limitations that can be viewed as opportunities for 
future research. Despite the instrumental variable test and the DID test (2012 anti-
corruption campaign) being capable of mitigating endogeneity problems to some extent, 
the study may still be subjected to omitted variable bias at the provincial level. In order 
to address this concern, although some regional factors (including firm fixed effect) that 
affect both alcohol-based corruption norms and corporate tax avoidance are controlled, 
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other unobserved time-variant variables remain possible to bias my results. Furthermore, 
although regional alcohol consumption is a relatively subjective measure for corruption 
norms, it may also reflect daily, normal social activities such as entertaining friends or 
relatives. Thus, future studies are expected to explore a better measure to capture the 
level of corruption norms. Moreover, future studies can focus on conducting 
investigation into whether sin culture such as smoking, pornography and gambling have 
adverse effect on other corporate misconducts such as accounting fraud. 
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Appendix 
Variable definitions 
Measures of tax avoidance 
ETR GAAP effective tax rate, calculated as total tax expense divided 
by pretax income. 
CETR Cash effective tax rate, calculated as cash income taxes paid 
divided by pretax income. 
Long-term ETR Long-term effective tax rate, calculated as the sum of total tax 
expense over the current and preceding four years scaled by the 
sum of pretax income net of special items over the same period. 
Measures of corruption norms/sin culture 
AlcoholPerCapita Per capita alcohol consumption per province, calculated as 
provincial alcohol consumption divided by provincial population. 
Data source: China Statistical Yearbook. 
HighAlcohol Indicator variable equal one if the province in which a firm is 
headquartered has AlcoholPerCapita above the sample median, 
and zero otherwise. 
TobaccoPerCapita Per capita tobacco consumption per province, calculated as 
provincial tobacco consumption divided by provincial population. 
Data source: China Statistical Yearbook. 
LotteryPerCapita Per capita lottery spending per province, calculated as provincial 
lottery spending divided by provincial population.  
Data source:  China Statistical Yearbook. 
Control variables: firm characteristics 
Size Natural logarithm of total equity at the beginning of the year. 
ROA Return on assets, calculated as net profit divided by 
total assets at the beginning of the year. 
Leverage Leverage ratio, calculated as long-term liability divided by total 
asset at the beginning of the year. 
MBRatio Market-to-book ratio, calculated as sum of market value of equity 
and book value of debt divided by book value of total assets at the 
beginning of the year. 
PPE Tangible assets intensity, calculated as fixed assets divided by 
total assets at the beginning of the year. 
Inventory Inventory intensity, calculated as inventory divided by by total 
assets at the beginning of the year. 
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Intangibles Intangible asset intensity, calculated as intangible assets divided 
by total assets at the beginning of the year. 
Cash_ratio Cash ratio, calculated as cash and cash equivalents divided by 
total assets at the beginning of the year. 
Duality Indicator variable equal one if the CEO is also the chairman of the 
firm; zero otherwise. 
Board_Indp Board independence, calculated as number of independent 
directors divided by total directors in the board. 
Right_sep Rights separation, calculated as the difference between controlling 
right (cash flow right) and voting right. 
Control variables: regional characteristics 
GDP_capita Provincial GDP per capita.  
GDP_growth Provincial GDP growth rate. 
Education Education attainment, calculated as the people with at least one 
year of college in a province divided by the population of people 
25 years and above in the corresponding province. 
Male Male ratio, calculated as the percentage of males in a provincial 
population. 
Instrumental variable for robustness test 
Temperature Annual average temperature in a province.  
Data source: CSMAR database. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std.Dev Min Median Max 
ETR 14511 0.202 0.129 0 0.173 0.698 
Long-term ETR 14511 0.213 0.092 0 0.202 0.362 
CETR 14511 0.211 0.225 0 0.166 0.675 
STR 11531 0.202 0.051 0.10 0.20 0.33 
AlcoholPerCapita 14511 229.7 101.2 51.40 219.9 590.2 
TobaccoPerCapita 13656 228.5 109.9 52.75 200.1 496.3 
LotteryPerCapita 16182 160.3 53.93 74.92 161.9 245.3 
ROA 14511 0.049 0.044 0 0.042 0.197 
Leverage 14511 0.069 0.098 0 0.020 0.434 
MB 14511 1.846 1.609 0.234 1.378 10.36 
PPE 14511 0.253 0.179 0.003 0.217 0.750 
Inventory 14511 0.167 0.152 0 0.131 0.723 
Intangible 14511 0.043 0.050 0 0.028 0.291 
Cash 14511 0.208 0.160 0.011 0.160 0.758 
GDP_capita 14511 4.722 0.020 4.658 4.723 4.819 
GDP_growth 14511 0.116 0.024 0.054 0.119 0.238 
Education 14511 0.102 0.029 0.047 0.098 0.300 
Male  14511 1.036 0.041 0.923 1.033 1.152 
Duality 14511 0.209 0.406 0 0 1 
Board_Indp 14511 0.363 0.050 0.250 0.333 0.556 
Right_sep 14511 0.061 0.084 0 0 0.302 
 
Table 2 Distribution of GAAP ETRs across industries 
Industry N ETRs 
Agriculture, forestry, and fishery 208 0.103 
Mining 461 0.245 
Manufacturing 8463 0.185 
Power, heat, gas and water production 722 0.211 
Construction 424 0.234 
Wholesale and retail 1050 0.272 
Transportation, warehousing and postal services 623 0.211 
Accommodation and catering 75 0.229 
Information transmission and software 739 0.149 
Estate 916 0.272 
Leasing and business services 200 0.252 
Scientific research and technical service 53 0.187 
Water, environmental and public facilities 154 0.202 
Education 8 0.293 
Health and social work 51 0.258 
Culture, sports and entertainment industry 176 0.195 
Conglomerate 188 0.236 
 
 
Table 3 Distribution of sin culture proxies across provinces 
Province N AlcoholPerCapita TobaccoPerCapita LotteryPerCapita 
Beijing 1112 426.6 210.4 230.1 
Anhui 512 315.1 308.6 92.96 
39 
 
Xizang12 67 301.8 446.3 326.5 
Shanghai 1242 297.2 365.9 173.8 
Tianjin 211 288.1 198.9 206.2 
Shandong 889 257.2 111.0 135.4 
Zhejiang 1349 237.7 392.0 232.4 
Neimeng 171 232.0 208.5 168.9 
Jiangsu 1259 229.8 291.5 168.8 
Liaoning 429 226.9 217.6 209.0 
Hebei 291 224.4 137.3 82.11 
Fujian 540 223.6 175.1 115.6 
Guangdong 1923 204.4 134.8 176.0 
Henan 394 198.4 143.5 61.5 
Gansu 167 187.5 199.4 133.8 
Qinghai 63 184.1 161.9 181.9 
Sichuan 526 178.2 230.9 86.6 
Shanxi 228 177.3 210.9 174.8 
Hubei 540 173.3 256.8 134.3 
Chongxing 201 155.0 243.3 150.4 
Jilin 270 152.8 137.1 119.4 
Hunan 390 148.7 215.7 97.8 
Guizhou 170 146.1 237.4 61.1 
Ningxia 73 138.2 192.3 190.7 
Heilongjiang 221 137.8 114.4 109.4 
Xinjinag 260 131.1 100.2 146.7 
Shanxi 224 123.3 185.6 90.5 
Jiangxi 251 118.0 169.1 79.5 
Yunnan 202 113.4 374.2 117.6 
Guangxi 181 111.2 101.4 96.8 
Hainan 155 88.75 122.3 161.8 
                                                          
12 From Table 3, it can be seen that Xizang is among the regions with highest alcohol consumption per 
capita. However, since observations from Xizang is very small, the result may be biased and may not 
reflect the corruption norms in Xizang. Consequentely, I deduct 67 observations from Xizang. The 
untabulated result indicates that the coefficient on alcohol consumption is still negative and statistically 
significant at 10% level, which supports my prediction that alcohol-based corruption norm leads to higher 
corporate tax avoidance.  
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Table 4 Pearson correlations 
 ETR CETR Long-term ETR AlcoholPerCapita TobaccoPerCapita Size ROA 
ETR 1       
CETR 0.3074* 1      
Long-term ETR 0.5910* 0.2271* 1     
AlcoholPerCapita -0.0676* -0.0950* -0.0322* 1    
TobaccoPerCapita -0.0365* -0.0636* -0.0179 0.5455* 1   
Size 0.0293* -0.0418* -0.1200* 0.2154* 0.0849* 1  
ROA -0.2014* -0.1331* -0.1834* 0.0799* 0.0431* 0.1024* 1 
Leverage 0.2093* 0.0618* 0.2119* -0.1295* -0.0635* 0.0817* -0.3842* 
MBRatio -0.1790* -0.0983* -0.0772* 0.0588* 0.0466* -0.2845* 0.4474* 
PPE 0.0233* 0.0386* -0.0296* -0.2184* -0.1735* 0.0990* -0.1134* 
Inventory 0.1671* 0.0458* 0.1940* -0.0001 0.0278* 0.0023 -0.1277* 
Intangible 0.0030 -0.0046 0.0287* 0.0136 0.0094 -0.0091 0.0006 
Cash ratio -0.1365* -0.0409* -0.0386* 0.1758* 0.1135* -0.1045* 0.2929* 
GDPpercapita 0.0336* 0.0137 0.0587* -0.1819* -0.2186* -0.0296* 0.0566* 
GDPgrowth 0.0739* 0.0832* 0.0760* -0.5478* -0.3446* -0.1433* -0.0327* 
Education -0.0435* -0.0495* -0.0208 0.3048* 0.1863* 0.1063* -0.0005 
Male -0.0541* -0.0407* -0.0986* 0.0124 -0.1096* 0.0548* 0.0120 
        
 Leverage MBRatio PPE Inventory Intangible Cashratio GDPpercapita 
Leverage 1       
MBRatio -0.4412* 1      
PPE 0.1114* -0.1521* 1     
Inventory 0.3375* -0.1689* -0.3938* 1    
Intangible -0.0039 0.0455* 0.0604* -0.2071* 1   
Cash ratio -0.5193* 0.3414* -0.4192* -0.2272* -0.1400* 1  
GDPpercapita 0.0519* 0.0974* 0.0541* -0.0092 -0.0475* 0.0120 1 
GDPgrowth 0.1310* 0.0401* 0.1580* 0.0291* -0.0200* -0.1148* 0.3508* 
Education -0.0173* 0.0611* -0.0442* -0.0232* 0.0890* 0.0510* -0.0292* 
Male -0.0737* -0.0170* -0.0346* -0.0437* 0.0413* 0.0436* -0.0927* 
        
 GDPgrowth Education Male    
GDPgrowth 1       
Education -0.0721* 1      
Male -0.2955* 0.0989* 1     
Note: Starred correlations are significant at the 0.05 level or lower 
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Table 5 Analysis the effect of of alcohol-based corruption norms on tax avoidance 
  
ETR 
 
ETR 
Stage 1: 
DV = AlcoholPerCapita 
Stage 2: 
DV = ETR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
AlcoholPerCapita -0.0283*** -0.0845**   
 (0.0096) (0.0428)   
CEO_Alcohol  0.0346   
  (0.0355)   
Pred_Alcohol    -0.0811** 
    (0.0390) 
Temperature   -0.0016**  
   (0.0007)  
Size 0.0100** 0.0087 0.0728*** -0.0575** 
 (0.0043) (0.013) (0.0031) (0.0282) 
ROA -0.5830*** -1.031*** -0.3720*** -0.0846 
 (0.0534) (0.137) (0.0822) (0.1620) 
Leverage 0.00243 -0.0432 -0.0500*** 0.0697*** 
 (0.0226) (0.0524) (0.0180) (0.0253) 
MBRatio -0.0030** -0.0045 0.0267*** -0.0257** 
 (0.0012) (0.0034) (0.0023) (0.0103) 
PPE 0.0179 -0.0926* -0.1980*** 0.2170*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0558) (0.0222) (0.0792) 
Inventory 0.0697*** 0.0439 0.0109 0.1140*** 
 (0.0196) (0.0817) (0.0269) (0.0250) 
Intangibles -0.0900 0.0043 0.0632 0.0442 
 (0.0550) (0.1390) (0.0654) (0.0626) 
Cash_ratio -0.0059 0.1130** 0.1260*** -0.0567 
 (0.0141) (0.0489) (0.0231) (0.0519) 
GDP_capita 0.0476 -0.5990* 0.1010 -0.0123 
 (0.1810) (0.3080) (0.1860) (0.1680) 
GDP_growth 0.0911 0.1140 -0.1064*** 0. 8843** 
 (0.1700) (0.2830) (0.1730) (0.4131) 
Education -0.0526 -1.2480** 0. 3771*** -0.3197** 
 (0.2070) (0.5750) (0.1280) (0.1468) 
Male 0.0824 0.1280 -0.2139 0.1676 
 (0.0663) (0.1210) (0.0718) (0.0833) 
Year fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
Constant -0.1490 0.1690 0.6358 -0.1360 
 (0.8820) (1.4930) (0.8540) (0.6280) 
Observations 14511 4,546 13,657 13,657 
R-squared 0.041 0.035 0.047 0.032 
Notes: This table shows the results of regressing the GAAP ETR on corruption norms inferred from alcohol consumption. All 
regressions include industry and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by firms and are reported in parentheses. 
CEO_alcohol is alcohol spending per capita in the province where the firm’s CEO come from. Temperature is the average annual 
temperature in the province where the firm is headquartered. Pred_Alcohol is the predicted value of AlcoholPerCapita based on 
the instrumental variable Temperature. Other variables are defined in the Appendix. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels, respectively.  
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Table 6 Analysis of the effect of alcohol-based corruption norms on tax avoidance by 
government ownership and firm size 
 Non-SOE Firm 
(1) 
SOE Firm 
(2) 
Large Firm 
(3) 
Small Firm 
(4) 
AlcoholPerCapita -0.0369*** -0.0194* -0.0153 -0.0359** 
 (0.0112) (0.0108) (0.0155) (0.0155) 
Size 0.0101 0.0083** -0.0056 0.0312*** 
 (0.0098) (0.0034) (0.0062) (0.0080) 
ROA -0.6080*** -0.5330*** -0.6440*** -0.5380*** 
 (0.1090) (0.0531) (0.0621) (0.0787) 
Leverage 0.0225 0.0383** -0.0005 -0.0116 
 (0.0182) (0.0165) (0.0309) (0.0411) 
MBRatio -0.0026 -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0015 
 (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0014) 
PPE 0.0047 0.0478* -0.0092 0.0208 
 (0.0173) (0.0227) (0.0327) (0.0263) 
Inventory 0.0429 0.0817** 0.0541 0.0474 
 (0.0293) (0.0328) (0.0447) (0.0350) 
Intangibles -0.1080 -0.1200* -0.0313 -0.1050 
 (0.0795) (0.0568) (0.0750) (0.0637) 
Cash_ratio 0.0023 0.0076 0.0023 -0.0138 
 (0.0319) (0.0133) (0.0153) (0.0179) 
GDP_capita 0.0503 -0.0012 -0.1870 0.1800 
 (0.1450) (0.1180) (0.1910) (0.2010) 
GDP_growth -0.0963 0.1970** -0.0301 0.1390 
 (0.1990) (0.0770) (0.1770) (0.2090) 
Education 0.0502 -0.1470 0.1790 -0.0814 
 (0.3600) (0.1510) (0.3260) (0.2280) 
Male 0.1000** 0.0742** 0.0459 0.1060 
 (0.0344) (0.0269) (0.0544) (0.1030) 
Year fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
Constant -0.1260 0.0430 1.2620 -1.1830 
 (0.8090) (0.5630) (0.8960) (1.0570) 
Observations 6,265 8,246 7,178 7,333 
R-squared 0.035 0.045 0.050 0.034 
p-value 0.5625 0.065 
Notes: This table shows the results of regressing the GAAP ETR on per capita alcohol consumption by 
government ownership and firms size. The sample is split into SOEs and non-SOEs on the basis of whether they 
are owned by the government or not. The sample is also split into large and small subsamples of firms based on 
whether their total assets are above the sample median.Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. All 
regressions include industry and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by firms and are reported 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 Analysis of the effect of alcohol-based corruption norms on tax avoidance for 
firms with low and high CEO stock-based compensation 
 Low CEO compansation 
(1) 
High CEO compansation 
(2) 
   
AlcoholPerCapita -0.0192 -0.0264** 
 (0.0171) (0.0119) 
Size 0.0179* 0.0084 
 (0.0098) (0.0053) 
ROA -0.5120*** -0.5690*** 
 (0.1030) (0.0548) 
Leverage -0.0012 0.0106 
 (0.0559) (0.0240) 
MBRatio 0.0018 -0.0041*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0014) 
PPE 0.0176 0.0244 
 (0.0372) (0.0254) 
Inventory -0.0239 0.0996*** 
 (0.0625) (0.0230) 
Intangibles 0.0432 -0.0843 
 (0.0865) (0.0655) 
Cash_ratio -0.0412 0.0102 
 (0.0269) (0.0186) 
GDP_capita 0.3290 -0.0286 
 (0.3380) (0.1640) 
GDP_growth -0.4950* 0.2320 
 (0.2560) (0.1680) 
Education -0.4480 -0.0270 
 (0.2740) (0.2360) 
Male -0.0010 0.0752 
 (0.0631) (0.0721) 
Year fixed effect Y Y 
Industry fixed effect Y Y 
Constant -1.4940 0.2140 
 (1.6470) (0.7940) 
Observations 4,941 8,716 
R-squared 0.029 0.044 
p-value 0.1038 
Notes: This table shows the results of regressing the GAAP ETR on per capita alcohol consumption for firms 
with high and low CEO compensation based on the sample median. Variable definitions are provided in the 
Appendix. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by firms 
and are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 8 Analysis of the effect of alcohol-based corruption norms on tax avoidance 
for firms with low and high statutory tax rates and with low and high levels of 
government subsidies. 
 Low Statutory 
Rate 
(1) 
High Statutory 
Rate 
(2) 
Low 
Subsidy 
(3) 
High 
Subsidy 
(4) 
     
AlcoholPerCapita 0.0111 -0.0343*** -0.0520*** -0.0216** 
 (0.0161) (0.0120) (0.0143) (0.0100) 
Size 0.0116 0.0173** 0.0161** 0.0052 
 (0.0095) (0.0070) (0.0065) (0.0061) 
ROA -0.4220*** -0.5560*** -0.4960*** -0.5980*** 
 (0.0631) (0.0961) (0.0901) (0.0617) 
Leverage 0.0315 0.0129 0.0008 0.0101 
 (0.0272) (0.0334) (0.0433) (0.0241) 
MBRatio 0.0005 0.0015 0.0013 -0.0035** 
 (0.0017) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0015) 
PPE 0.0213 -0.0052 0.0096 -0.0005 
 (0.0288) (0.0423) (0.0303) (0.0274) 
Inventory 0.1170*** 0.0602* 0.0448 0.0616* 
 (0.0352) (0.0315) (0.0377) (0.0305) 
Intangibles 0.1550* -0.2290** -0.1750** -0.1020 
 (0.0783) (0.0931) (0.0685) (0.0713) 
Cash_ratio -0.0006 -0.0189 -0.0519* -0.0062 
 (0.0203) (0.0342) (0.0292) (0.0228) 
GDP_capita 0.1380 0.1660 -0.0336 0.1080 
 (0.1180) (0.2500) (0.2440) (0.2150) 
GDP_growth -0.1540 -0.0926 0.3090 0.0021 
 (0.1750) (0.2030) (0.2480) (0.1480) 
Education 0.0359 1.1090** 0.9710** -0.1240 
 (0.3760) (0.5250) (0.4390) (0.1950) 
Male 0.0109 -0.0483 0.1390** 0.0952* 
 (0.0354) (0.0831) (0.0609) (0.0518) 
Year fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
Constant -0.7980 -0.7660 0.0550 -0.3550 
 (0.5750) (1.2430) (1.180) (1.0670) 
Observations 6,179 5,352 4,879 8,777 
R-squared 0.033 0.037 0.035 0.039 
p-value 0.0171 0.4699 
Notes: This table shows the results of regressing the GAAP ETR on per capita alcohol consumption for 
firms with high and low statutory tax rates (based on the sample median) and with high and low levels of 
government subsidies (based on the sample median). Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by firms and 
are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 9 Analysis of the effect of alcohol-based corruption norms on tax avoidance 
for firms in regions with low and high government quality 
 Low government quality 
(1) 
High government quality 
(2) 
   
AlcoholPerCapita -0.0451*** 0.0013 
 (0.0088) (0.0150) 
Size 0.0186*** -0.0024 
 (0.0057) (0.0048) 
ROA -0.5990*** -0.5540*** 
 (0.0563) (0.0911) 
Leverage -0.0422 0.0562* 
 (0.0260) (0.0304) 
MBRatio -0.0028* -0.0027* 
 (0.0016) (0.0013) 
PPE -0.0146 0.0511 
 (0.0227) (0.0321) 
Inventory 0.0546 0.0894*** 
 (0.0321) (0.0250) 
Intangibles -0.1390** -0.0577 
 (0.0487) (0.0955) 
Cash_ratio -0.0314 0.0264 
 (0.0182) (0.0237) 
GDP_capita 0.1410 -0.0325 
 (0.1840) (0.3550) 
GDP_growth -0.0796 0.2360 
 (0.1630) (0.2380) 
Education 0.1270 -0.3700 
 (0.2340) (0.3760) 
Male 0.0259 0.1730 
 (0.0433) (0.1300) 
Year fixed effect Y Y 
Industry fixed effect Y Y 
Constant -0.6000 0.2250 
 (0.8890) (1.7630) 
Observations 6,456 7,200 
R-squared 0.0430 0.0440 
p-value 0.2796 
Notes: This table shows the results of regressing the GAAP ETR on per capita alcohol consumption for firms 
in regions with high and low government quality. I partition the sample into Low Government Quality and 
High Government Quality subsamples based on the median index of government effectiveness reported by 
the World Bank (2006). Other variables are defined in the Appendix. All regressions include industry and 
year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by firms and are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table 10 Analysis of the effect of alcohol-based corruption norms on tax avoidance 
for firms in regions with different degrees of external scrutiny 
 Low Audit Rate 
(1) 
High Audit Rate 
(2) 
Low Publicity 
(3) 
High Publicity 
(4) 
AlcoholPerCapita -0.0370*** 0.0154 -0.0338*** 0.0201 
 (0.0059) (0.0101) (0.0108) (0.0300) 
Size 0.0135*** 0.0060 0.0118** -0.0008 
 (0.0033) (0.0042) (0.0047) (0.0100) 
ROA -0.6820*** -0.4220*** -0.5650*** -0.7280*** 
 (0.1090) (0.0423) (0.0547) (0.1090) 
Leverage 0.0151 0.0186 0.0019 0.01840 
 (0.0118) (0.0183) (0.0254) (0.0746) 
MBRatio -0.0018 -0.0002 -0.0025** -0.0042 
 (0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0011) (0.0039) 
PPE -0.0006 0.0453** 0.0100 0.1060* 
 (0.0133) (0.0163) (0.0228) (0.0528) 
Inventory 0.0425** 0.0726** 0.0565** 0.1290** 
 (0.0155) (0.0256) (0.0229) (0.0545) 
Intangibles -0.2180*** 0.1200* -0.0784 -0.3250** 
 (0.0385) (0.0579) (0.0590) (0.1450) 
Cash_ratio 0.0132 0.0226 -0.0116 0.0575 
 (0.0206) (0.0174) (0.0160) (0.0416) 
GDP_capita 0.1280 -0.1260 0.0244 0.1440 
 (0.1410) (0.1660) (0.166) (0.5210) 
GDP_growth 0.0933 -0.0008 0.0048 0.8290** 
 (0.1690) (0.1410) (0.1590) (0.3180) 
Education -0.1370 0.3770 -0.0491 0.0545 
 (0.1960) (0.3630) (0.2110) (0.5680) 
Male 0.0300 0.0278 0.1080 -0.0495 
 (0.0389) (0.0278) (0.0645) (0.1310) 
Year fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
Constant -0.4800 0.4870 -0.0637 -0.6010 
 (0.7100) (0.7790)   
Observations 6,949 6,708 12,489 1,167 
R-squared 0.0480 0.0370 0.0370 0.1070 
p-value 0.0811 0.6589 
Notes: This table shows the results of regressing the GAAP ETR on per capita alcohol consumption for firms 
in regions with high and low tax audit rates (based on the sample median) and with high and low publicity 
(based on whether the firm’s owner appear in the Hurun Rich List in a year). Other variables are defined in 
the Appendix. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered 
by firms and are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table 11  Robustness test: High versus low levels of alcohol consumption 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  
ETR 
Stage 1: 
DV =  HighAlcohol 
Stage 2: 
DV = ETR 
HighAlcohol -0.0063***   
 (0.0019)   
Pred_Alcohol   -0.510*** 
   (0.178) 
Temperature  -0.0023***  
  (0.0007)  
Size 0.0067* 0.0664*** 0.0350*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0121) 
ROA -0.5670*** -0.4610*** -0.6440*** 
 (0.0653) (0.1010) (0.1000) 
Leverage 0.0180* -0.1060** -0.0604* 
 (0.0092) (0.0426) (0.0312) 
MBRatio -0.00300** 0.0281*** 0.0092* 
 (0.0012) (0.0029) (0.0054) 
PPE 0.0200* -0.1810*** -0.0362 
 (0.0100) (0.0271) (0.0364) 
Inventory 0.0628*** 0.0054 0.1320*** 
 (0.0177) (0.0330) (0.0196) 
Intangibles -0.1010** -0.0036 0.0969** 
 (0.0383) (0.0768) (0.0434) 
Cash_ratio 0.0026 0.1280*** 0.0940*** 
 (0.0094) (0.0292) (0.0289) 
GDP_capita 0.1060 -0.1600 0.0037 
 (0.1080) (0.1940) (0.1130) 
GDP_growth 0.1410 -10.8300 -5.2620 
 (0.1290) (0.1760) (1.9360) 
Education -0.2830 0.3755*** 0.7380*** 
 (0.1900) (0.1260) (0.6680) 
Male 0.0823 -1.7150*** -0.8960*** 
 (0.0328) (0.0860) (0.2990) 
Year fixed effect Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effect Y Y Y 
Constant -0.4950 0.2423*** 0.9110 
 (0.5550) (0.0900) (0.672) 
Observations 14,511 13,657 13,657 
R-squared 0.0390 0.0372 0.0911 
Notes: This table shows the results of regressing the GAAP ETR on an alternative measure of alcohol consumption. 
HighAlcohol equals one for firms headquartering in a province where per capita alcohol spending is higher than the 
sample median; zero otherwise. Other variables are defined in the Appendix. All regressions include industry and 
year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by firms and are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table 12  Robustness test: Use another measure for alcohol consumption, which 
scales the alcohol consumption per capita by household income per capita 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  
ETR 
Stage 1: 
DV =  AlcoholRatio 
Stage 2: 
DV = ETR 
AlcoholRatio -0.0154***   
 (0.00472)   
Pred_Alcohol   -0.0472*** 
   (0.00845) 
Temperature  -0.0277***  
  (0.000486)  
Size 0.00205* 0.00877*** 0.000815 
 (0.00118) (0.00184) (0.00112) 
ROA -0.421*** 0.0502 -0.413*** 
 (0.0347) (0.0483) (0.0294) 
Leverage 0.00165 -0.0258 -0.00446 
 (0.0144) (0.0201) (0.0129) 
MBRatio -0.00427*** 0.000104 -0.00494*** 
 (0.00106) (0.00147) (0.000813) 
PPE 0.0531*** 0.0623*** 0.0525*** 
 (0.00892) (0.0130) (0.00821) 
Inventory 0.137*** 0.0113 0.129*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0147) (0.0100) 
Intangibles 0.119*** 0.123*** 0.0941*** 
 (0.0238) (0.0368) (0.0222) 
Cash_ratio 0.0392*** 0.0485*** 0.0275*** 
 (0.00830) (0.0130) (0.00869) 
GDP_capita 0.0609 2.672*** -0.0232 
 (0.0735) (0.160) (0.0592) 
GDP_growth 0.175*** 0.407*** 0.258*** 
 (0.0664) (0.113) (0.0508) 
Education -0.135*** 2.428*** -0.298*** 
 (0.0420) (0.0738) (0.0434) 
Male -0.0482* -0.666*** 0.0154 
 (0.0275) (0.0384) (0.0289) 
Year fixed effect Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effect Y Y Y 
Constant -0.223 -0.1088 0.0926 
 (0.344) (0.0752) (0.273) 
Observations 13,657 13,657 13,657 
R-squared 0.044 0.0454 0.133 
Notes: This table shows the results of regressing the GAAP ETR on an alternative measure of alcohol consumption. 
AlcoholRatio equals alcohol consumption per capita in a region where the firm headquartered scaled by household 
income per capita in that region. Other variables are defined in the Appendix. All regressions include industry and 
year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by firms and are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table 13  Robustness test: Cash ETR and long-term ETR 
 CETR CETR Long-term ETR Long-term ETR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AlcoholPerCapita -0.0400**  -0.0356***  
 (0.0153)  (0.0124)  
HighAlcohol  -0.0141***  -0.0046** 
  (0.0047)  (0.0022) 
Size -0.0019 -0.0066*** 0.0120** -0.0088*** 
 (0.0040) (0.0021) (0.0051) (0.0010) 
ROA -0.8740*** -0.6360*** -0.0726* -0.3040*** 
 (0.1200) (0.0535) (0.0382) (0.0287) 
Leverage -0.0867*** -0.0302** -0.0272 0.0585*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0135) (0.0180) (0.0068) 
MBRatio -0.0070*** -0.0082*** 0.0002 0.0044*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0010) 
PPE -0.0668* 0.0588*** -0.0116 0.0808*** 
 (0.0319) (0.0152) (0.0145) (0.0073) 
Inventory 0.0599** 0.0939*** 0.0841*** 0.1160*** 
 (0.0244) (0.0205) (0.0176) (0.0091) 
Intangibles -0.0232 0.0547 -0.0067 0.1600*** 
 (0.0713) (0.0401) (0.0340) (0.0199) 
Cash_ratio 0.0890*** 0.0838*** 0.0438*** 0.0811*** 
 (0.0245) (0.0162) (0.0152) (0.0102) 
GDP_capita -0.3030 -0.0626 0.2570** 0.1190** 
 (0.1840) (0.1000) (0.1250) (0.0486) 
GDP_growth 0.3940*** 0.5570*** -0.0951 0.0037 
 (0.1250) (0.1050) (0.1270) (0.0494) 
Education -1.4000*** -0.2500*** 0.2520 -0.0158 
 (0.3900) (0.0709) (0.2360) (0.0324) 
Male 0.1480 -0.0631 0.1010** -0.1250*** 
 (0.0294) (0.0466) (0.0460) (0.0221) 
Year fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
Constant 0.9210* 0.6230 -0.2160* -0.2300 
 (0.9260) (0.4700) (0.6130) (0.2300) 
Observations 14511 14511 14,511 14,511 
R-squared 0.0360 0.0470 0.0220 0.2150 
Notes: This table shows the results of regressing the cash ETR and 5-year GAAP ETR on alcohol 
consumption. All variables are defined in the Appendix. All regressions include industry and year fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by firms and are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table 14  Robustness test: Controlling for corporate governance 
 ETR CETR Long-term ETR 
AlcoholPerCapita -0.0181* -0.0313** -0.0357*** 
 (0.0095) (0.0122) (0.0118) 
Size 0.0110** -0.0057 0.0120* 
 (0.0049) (0.0042) (0.0061) 
ROA -0.5520*** -0.8650*** -0.0716* 
 (0.0556) (0.1500) (0.0419) 
Leverage 0.0127 -0.0737*** -0.0378** 
 (0.0240) (0.0193) (0.0165) 
MBRatio -0.0024 -0.0061*** -0.0002 
 (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0012) 
PPE 0.0155 -0.0679 -0.0120 
 (0.0212) (0.0409) (0.0137) 
Inventory 0.0662*** 0.0326 0.0751*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0335) (0.0185) 
Intangibles -0.0992 -0.0303 -0.0361 
 (0.0585) (0.0782) (0.0347) 
Cash_ratio -0.0150 0.0994*** 0.0373** 
 (0.0124) (0.0266) (0.0139) 
GDP_capita 0.0935 -0.2400 0.3010** 
 (0.1820) (0.1910) (0.1130) 
GDP_growth 0.0711 0.4040*** -0.1220 
 (0.1780) (0.1210) (0.1240) 
Education -0.2140 -0.9560*** 0.2290 
 (0.2400) (0.2420) (0.2370) 
Male 0.0614 0.1100** 0.0901** 
 (0.0664) (0.0427) (0.0439) 
Duality -0.0019 0.0012 -0.0088 
 (0.0050) (0.0057) (0.0061) 
Board_Indp 0.0124 0.0297 -0.0163 
 (0.0432) (0.0682) (0.0333) 
Right_sep -0.0030 0.1050** -0.0153 
 (0.0310) (0.0492) (0.0279) 
Year fixed effect Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effect Y Y Y 
Constant -0.4060 0.6240* -0.3910** 
 (0.8710) (0.9170) (0.5850) 
Observations 14511 14511 14,511 
R-squared 0.0360 0.0280 0.0240 
Notes: This table shows the results of regressing the GAAP ETR on per capita alcohol consumption after controlling for internal 
governance.  Internal governance variables (Duality, board independence, and separation of cash righrs and control rights) are defined 
in the Appendix. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by firms and are reported 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table 15  Robustness test: Adding Firm fixed effects 
 ETR CETR Long-term_ETR 
AlcoholPerCapita -0.0252*** -0.0494*** -0.0144*** 
 (0.00687) (0.0146) (0.00453) 
Size 0.00829*** 0.00112 -0.0227*** 
 (0.00262) (0.00555) (0.00183) 
ROA -0.581*** -0.805*** -0.292*** 
 (0.0344) (0.0729) (0.0231) 
Leverage 0.00118 0.0804** -0.0243** 
 (0.0167) (0.0354) (0.0102) 
MBRatio -0.00291*** -0.00557*** 0.00178** 
 (0.000968) (0.00205) (0.000712) 
PPE 0.0173 -0.0645** -0.00502 
 (0.0127) (0.0269) (0.00815) 
Inventory 0.0677*** 0.0380 0.0546*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0324) (0.00960) 
Intangibles -0.0960*** -0.0362 0.0492** 
 (0.0316) (0.0671) (0.0202) 
Cash_ratio -0.00189 0.106*** 0.0378*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0256) (0.00972) 
GDP_capita 0.0450 -0.322* 0.0991** 
 (0.0779) (0.165) (0.0491) 
GDP_growth 0.0893 0.357** -0.0890** 
 (0.0701) (0.149) (0.0437) 
Education -0.0501 -1.469*** 0.515*** 
 (0.119) (0.253) (0.0800) 
Male 0.0918*** 0.148** 0.0196 
 (0.0339) (0.0718) (0.0215) 
Year fixed effect Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effect Y Y Y 
Firm fixed effect Y Y Y 
Constant -0.127 0.962** 0.236 
 (0.378) (0.803) (0.239) 
Observations 14,511 14,511 14,511 
R-squared 0.0390 0.0350 0.0770 
Notes: This table shows the results of regressing the GAAP ETR on per capita alcohol consumption after 
adding firm fixed effects. Other variables are defined in the Appendix. All regressions include industry 
and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by firms and are reported in parentheses. ***, 
** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table 16  The impact of different forms of sin culture on tax avoidance 
 ETR ETR 
TobaccoPerCapita -0.0439*** -0.0385***   
 (0.0086) (0.0092)   
LotteryPerCapita   -0.0181*** -0.0215*** 
   (0.0056) (0.0066) 
Size 0.0111** 0.0123** 0.0235*** 0.0253*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0048) (0.0075) (0.0080) 
ROA -0.5870*** -0.5570*** -0.3750*** -0.3660*** 
 (0.0514) (0.0526) (0.0818) (0.0749) 
Leverage 0.0024 0.0135 0.0636*** 0.0721*** 
 (0.0223) (0.0237) (0.0191) (0.0181) 
MBRatio -0.0021* -0.0015 0.0022 0.0025* 
 (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0014) 
PPE 0.0146 0.0115 -0.0014 0.0077 
 (0.0203) (0.0214) (0.0314) (0.0307) 
Inventory 0.0701*** 0.0660*** 0.0731* 0.0560 
 (0.0198) (0.0205) (0.0397) (0.0448) 
Intangibles -0.0864 -0.0961 0.0539 0.0427 
 (0.0566) (0.0606) (0.1010) (0.0886) 
Cash_ratio -0.0008 -0.0097 0.0284 0.0341 
 (0.0150) (0.0140) (0.0224) (0.0210) 
GDP_capita 0.0033 0.0278 0.1700 0.1650 
 (0.1740) (0.1800) (0.1650) (0.1810) 
GDP_growth 0.0653 0.0307 -0.3950** -0.4330** 
 (0.1550) (0.1660) (0.1640) (0.1670) 
Education 0.0430 -0.0624 0.2310 0.0278 
 (0.1980) (0.2450) (0.3520) (0.3760) 
Male 0.0737 0.0630 -0.0295 -0.0240 
 (0.0482) (0.0503) (0.0321) (0.0375) 
Duality  -0.0015  0.0049 
  (0.0052)  (0.0061) 
Board_Indp  0.0061  0.0492 
  (0.0425)  (0.0491) 
Right_sep  -0.0026  0.0209 
  (0.0306)  (0.0691) 
Year fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
Constant 0.1200 -0.0266 -0.1440 -0.1670 
 (0.8450) (0.8700) (0.8360) (0.9180) 
Observations 13,656 13,656 16,182 16,182 
R-squared 0.0420 0.0370 0.0360 0.0380 
Notes: This table shows the results of regressing the GAAP ETR on other forms of sin culture: tobacco consumption and gambling 
attitude. TobaccoPerCapita is tobacco spending per capita in the province where the firm is headquartered. LotteryPerCapita is lottery 
spending per capita in the province where the firm is headquartered. Other variables are defined in the Appendix. All regressions 
include industry and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by firms and are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels, respectively. 
 
